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This paper analyses the influence of large shareholders and bank owner-
ship on earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings-return rela-
tion, in Spain. The results suggest that the expropriation effect is domi-
nant at any level of ownership concentration. Furthermore, bank
ownership is positively associated with the explanatory power of earnings
for returns, being consistent with the role of banks as shareholders that
actively monitor the firm’s business performance. This effect is similar re-
gardless of whether the bank is the major shareholder of the firm or not.
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P revious studies have analysed how the separation of corporate ownershipand control and concentrated ownership affect both the informativeness ofaccounting earnings and the accounting choices of managers. Agency theo-ry suggests that management and external shareholder interests divergewhen management owns a lower number of shares in the firm [Jensen and
Meckling (1976)], thus increasing the need for accounting-based performance
measures to monitor managers. However, management typically has the possibili-
ty of exerting discretion over the recognition of accruals and this discretion may
be used by managers to signal their private information or to opportunistically
manipulate earnings. Insofar as managers use their discretion to manipulate accru-
als, earnings will become less informative. Moreover, via their choice of accepted
accounting procedures, managers may choose to reflect either the economics un-
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derlying the transactions or accounting numbers for personal benefit. Examining
US data, Warfield et al. (1995) find evidence of a positive relationship between
managerial ownership and the information content of earnings.
Several papers have extended the study of Warfield et al. (1995). On the one
hand, Gabrielsen et al. (2002) report a negative relationship between managerial
ownership and the information content of earnings among Danish firms. This
finding highlighted the difference between the two institutional settings. Yeo et al.
(2002), on the other hand, find a non-linear relation between managerial owner-
ship and the informativeness of earnings for companies listed on the Singapore
Stock Exchange. At low levels of management ownership, the informativeness of
earnings increases with managerial ownership. At higher levels of managerial
ownership, however, the relationship is reversed, suggesting that the entrenchment
effect may have set in. In consonance with the role of a large shareholder acting
as a monitor, the evidence also shows a positive relationship between external, un-
related block holdings and the informativeness of earnings. 
Large shareholders and ownership concentration constitute a response to the
lack of legal protection. If legal protection does not provide sufficient control
rights to small investors, then investors can probably obtain more effective control
rights by being large [La Porta et al. (1998)]. Some concentration of ownership of
a firm’s shares is typically efficient in providing large investors with incentives to
monitor managers [Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. Large shareholders have incen-
tives to collect information and monitor management and, thus, address the agency
problem because they have both a general interest in value maximization and
enough control over the assets of the firm to make their interest respected (the so-
called “monitoring effect”). On the other hand, large investors can represent their
own interests, using their control rights to maximize their own welfare and expro-
priate minority shareholders (the so-called “expropriation effect”). The evidence
on the role of large shareholders in exercising corporate governance is conflicting.
Among others, Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Gorton and Schmid (2000) have
upheld the view that large shareholders play an active role in corporate gover-
nance. However, Morck et al. (1988) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) present evi-
dence in which large shareholders earn rents from their control over firms. Since
controlling shareholders oversee accounting reporting policies, the informative-
ness of earnings reveals whether the large shareholders act as active shareholders
monitoring managers or, to the contrary, they represent their own interests and
enjoy private benefits of control.
Within this context, the aim of this paper is to analyse the influence of large
shareholders on earnings informativeness in Spain. This was done by analysing the
earnings-return relation. The explanatory power of earnings for stock returns is a
measure of the informativeness of earnings that has been widely employed [Collins
et al. (1987); Collins and Kothari (1989); Warfield et al. (1995)]1. Accrual-based
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(1) Nonetheless, Poveda and Iñiguez (2001) reveal that firms which smooth earnings yield higher
stock returns than firms which do not, showing that stock markets may not be efficient in evaluat-
ing earnings management.
models focussing on management’s use of discretionary accruals have also been
used to detect earnings management. These models require an estimation of the
discretionary components of reported income using models such as the one pro-
posed by Jones (1991) [Dechow et al. (1995); Kothari et al. (2005)]. This has been
the alternative followed by most studies that have analyzed earnings management
practices in the Spanish case2. The effect of ownership structure on earnings man-
agement in non-financial Spanish firms has been studied by García-Osma and Gill
de Albornoz (2005), Santana-Martín et al. (2007) and Sánchez-Ballesta and Gar-
cía-Meca (2007). The second paper reveals a negative relationship between the
concentration of ownership and the credibility of accounting information. García-
Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2005) show that the presence of board members who
represent the interests of large shareholders acts as a constraint on manipulative
practices. Recently, Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) have shown a non-
linear relationship between insider ownership (common shares held by board
members) and the informativeness of earnings. Insider ownership contributes to
the informativeness of earnings when the proportion of shares held by insiders is
not very high. However, they do not find a negative influence of ownership con-
centration on earnings’ explanatory power for returns as Santana-Martín et al.
(2007) do. None of these studies analyze the effect of bank ownership on the infor-
mativeness of earnings or the possible existence of a non-linear effect between
ownership concentration and the informativeness of earnings.
Within this context, the present paper first analyses role of banks as a moni-
tor of management through their influence on the informativeness of earnings.
Furthermore, the paper also analyses the existence of a different role of the bank
depending on whether it is the major shareholder or not. 
Secondly, the paper examines the influence of the ownership structure on the
informativeness of earnings. Since previous evidence has not produced consensus,
this is an important issue. Moreover, the existence of a non-linear effect of owner-
ship by the major shareholder on the informativeness of earnings is studied. Since
we jointly consider bank ownership and the equity ownership of the main share-
holder, the paper provides more comprehensive evidence on the link between
ownership structure and the quality of financial reporting.
Spain is a natural setting for examining these issues, as it features relatively
weak protection of minority shareholders, high ownership concentration and an
abundance of bank ownership. These characteristics are common to many countries
[La Porta et al. (1999)] and, hence, the obtained results may be extrapolated.
Findings show that ownership structure has an influence on the informative-
ness of earnings. Bank ownership is positively associated with the explanatory
power of earnings for returns. This monitoring effect is similar regardless of
whether the bank is the major shareholder of the firm or not. Moreover, a negative
relationship exists between ownership concentration and earnings informative-
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(2) Apellániz (1992), Saurina (1999), Poveda and Iñiguez (2001) and Blasco and Pelegrin (2005)
have shown the existence of profit smoothing in Spanish financial and non-financial firms.
ness, measured by the earnings-return relation. This evidence is consistent with
the expropriation effect being dominant at any level of ownership concentration. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the re-
lationship between ownership structure and earnings informativeness; Section 3
describes the data and methodology employed, while Section 4 presents and dis-
cusses the results; and, finally, Section 5 summarizes and presents the conclusions
of the study.
1. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS
The degree of ownership concentration affects the nature of contracting, cre-
ating agency problems between managers and outside shareholders. When owner-
ship is diffuse, as for example in the US and the UK, agency problems stem from
the conflicts of interest between outside shareholders and managers who own an
insignificant amount of equity in the firm [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. The
managers of low managerial ownership firms have greater incentives to manage
accounting numbers. Thus, the informativeness of earnings is predicted to be pos-
itively related to managerial ownership, as Warfield et al. (1995) have shown. On
the other hand, a substantial shareholder has incentives to collect information and
monitor management, thereby avoiding the traditional free-rider problem. In con-
sonance with this control activity by large shareholders, Yeo et al. (2002) and
Jung and Kwon (2002) show a positive relationship between the existence of large
shareholders and the informativeness of earnings. This would be the predicted re-
lationship if the monitoring effect derived from the presence of large shareholders
were dominant. 
However, when ownership is concentrated, as is typical in Spain, the nature
of the agency problem shifts from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts be-
tween the major shareholder (controlling owner) and minority shareholders. Large
shareholders represent their own interests and enforce decisions that afford them
some private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. Minority
shareholders face the uncertainty of whether the controlling owner may oppor-
tunistically deprive them of their rights. As a consequence, an increase in major
shareholder ownership may result in an expropriation of minority shareholders, as
the controlling shareholder is increasingly less subject to market discipline re-
garding corporate control. This is further influenced by weak legal systems [La
Porta et al. (2002)]. 
The expropriation effect of ownership concentration potentially affects the fi-
nancial reporting of firms. As the controlling owner oversees accounting reporting
policies and is recognized as having strong opportunistic incentives to expropriate
minority shareholders, the market presumes that the owner will not report high-
quality accounting information. This market perception will reduce the credibility
of accounting earnings reports and, consequently, the informativeness of these
earnings. Accounting numbers produced by controlling shareholders would thus
be less informative to the market, a negative relation being expected between
ownership concentration and the informativeness of earnings. Fan and Wong
(2002) find this result in their study in seven East Asian economies. 
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A complementary argument is that a higher ownership stake allows firms to
limit their information disclosure to the public [Fan and Wong (2002)]. Opacity
can be a good strategy, because it prevents leakage of proprietary information
about specific knowledge to competitors. In this respect, it is in the interest of
both the major shareholder and the minority shareholders to release as little ac-
counting information to the public as possible. This information effect argument
suggests that high ownership concentration is associated with low earnings infor-
mativeness, as is likewise found for the expropriation effect.
The distinction between the monitoring effect and the expropriation effect of
large shareholders on the informativeness of earnings is thus an important issue.
The above arguments lead to the first hypothesis.
H1: “The relationship between large shareholder ownership and the informa-
tiveness of earnings will be positive if the monitoring effect is predominant. If, how-
ever, the expropriation effect predominates, this relationship will be negative”.
The study also tests the influence of bank ownership on earnings informa-
tiveness. Since banks are often characterised as sophisticated investors who have
advantages in the acquisition and processing of information, they may be consid-
ered as monitoring institutions that scrutinize management, thus implying fewer
opportunities for accruals management or earnings manipulation. Information
asymmetries are central to the literature on financial intermediation as developed
by Diamond (1984) and others [see Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) for a re-
view]. In fact, the rationale underlying the existence of banks may well reside in
their role in mitigating informational asymmetries. Theoretical work by Leland
and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Fama
(1985) suggest that banks possess certain cost advantages in the domain of infor-
mation collection and processing. For example, Fama (1985) argues that, as insid-
ers, banks have access to inside information, whereas outside (public) debtholders
must rely mostly on publicly available information. As they have superior infor-
mation, banks can provide more efficient monitoring, thus lowering the monitor-
ing and bonding costs of other debt claimants. If scale economies exist in infor-
mation production and information is durable and not easily transferred, these
theories suggest that a firm with close ties to financial institutions should have a
lower cost of capital and greater availability of funds compared to a firm without
such ties [Petersen and Rajan (1994); Berger and Udell (1995); Datta et al. (1999)].
Banks can hold equity stakes in industrial firms in diverse countries such as
Germany, Japan and Spain. In Spain, banks take equity in firms, play an active
role in General Assemblies of Shareholders and maintain board representation3.
Ownership concentration and the close ties between banks and firms are the main
control mechanisms in Spain. If banks are active shareholders monitoring the
firms in which they have equity stakes, this situation leads to closer monitoring or
scrutiny of managers and implies fewer opportunities for accruals management or
Large shareholders, bank ownership and informativeness of earnings
85
(3) A further channel of substantial influence comes via the proxy votes that small shareholders
delegate to the banks acting as custodians for their stock portfolios.
earnings manipulation. Several papers have reported evidence along these lines.
Hsu and Koh (2005) suggest that long-term oriented institutions can act as a cor-
porate governance mechanism to mitigate aggressive earnings management. Dou-
thett and Jung (2001) show that the close relationships within the keiretsu group
increase the informativeness of earnings.
As large shareholders, however, banks can enforce decisions that would give
them some private benefits of control. Moreover, banks can choose from a wide
range of ways to obtain private benefits4. They can use the traditional credit chan-
nel by charging interest at above market rates [Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)], or
they can provide an extensive variety of services at a premium above the market
rate. Boehmer (2000) analyses the role of banks as large shareholders in a sample
of German bidder firms. Takeovers only increase the value of an acquiring firm
that has banks as blockholders if bank control is counterbalanced by another large
shareholder and firms controlled by banks effect the worst takeovers. Casasola
and Tribó (2005) find that the effect on a firm’s returns is negative when a bank
buys the largest stake, while this effect does not apply when a bank buys the sec-
ond largest stake. These arguments show the importance of distinguishing be-
tween the monitoring effect and the expropriation effect of bank ownership on the
informativeness of earnings, depending on whether the bank is the major share-
holder or not, and lead to the second hypothesis. 
H2: “Bank ownership will be positively associated with the explanatory
power of earnings for returns as a consequence of the existence of a monitoring
effect, especially if the bank is not the major shareholder of the firm”. 
2. DATABASE AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
2.1. Database
The degree to which the large shareholders in firms, and especially banks, af-
fect earnings informativeness is analysed for the non-financial firms listed on the
Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 1991-2003. The Spanish financial sys-
tem is a bank-oriented system in which banks maintain close ties with industrial
firms, taking equity in them. Ownership and financial data are collected from the
Ownership Database and Financial Database distributed by the CNMV (Spanish
SEC) and are available for the end of each year from 1990 to 20035. The stock re-
turns data of publicly traded companies are obtained from the Madrid Stock Ex-
change Database. In order to be included in the sample, ownership data, annual
Revista de Economía Aplicada
86
(4) The empirical literature has not reached consensus on the effect of bank ownership on firm re-
turns. While papers such as those by Cable (1985), Gorton and Schmid (2000) or Boehmer (2000)
have shown a positive effect, Morck et al. (2000) or Goergen et al. (2005), among others, have
found a negative influence. In Spain, Zoido (1998) provides weak evidence in favour of the idea
that banks exercise their control rights as shareholders over the decisions that firms make. This
control is reflected in a lower cost of financing new projects and in the way that firms solve their
financial distress problems.
(5) The test of the informativeness of earnings requires price data for a previous year, in this case,
1990.
earnings per share and data necessary to compute stock returns must be available.
These criteria yield 235 firms. The complete sample consists of 1,681 firm-year
observations.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF OWNERSHIP VARIABLES
Variables (%) Mean Standard Deviation First Quartile Median Third Quartile
OWN1 39.90 26.47 17.68 33.65 57.52
OWN3 54.15 24.91 33.55 54.65 72.25
OWN5 58.65 24.04 41.03 59.72 75.69
BANKOWN 10.62 16.59 0 3.80 15.02
The table presents the characteristics of ownership concentration and bank ownership for Spanish
Stock Exchange listed firms over the period 1991-2003. OWN1 / OWN3 / OWN5 are the respecti-
ve percentages of common shares held by the major / three major / five major shareholder/s. BAN-
KOWN is the percentage of common shares held by banks.
Source: Own elaboration.
The average banking stake in non-financial firms and ownership concentra-
tion is reported in Table 1. In 52.97% of the firm-year observations, a bank has a
percentage of the firm equity. The mean (median) percent of bank ownership in
the sample is 10.62 (3.80) %. La Porta et al. (1999) show that there are several
countries in which banks take important stakes in firms. While the sample average
of financial institution-controlled firms is 5%, financial institutions control 30%
of firms in Belgium, 15% of firms in Germany, Portugal and Sweden and 10% in
Spain and Greece, if we say that a corporation has a controlling share when its di-
rect and indirect voting rights in the firm exceed 20%. 
Spanish firms are characterised by ownership concentration; in fact, the
mean (median) percentage of equity held by the major shareholder is 39.90
(33.65) %. This increases to 54.15 (54.65) % and 58.65 (59.72) % when we con-
siderer the top three or five major shareholders, respectively. Becht and Röell
(1999) report a median largest voting block of 34.2% for 193 Spanish firms. In
many parts of continental Europe, there are generally large blockholders present
who can and do exercise control over management. The median largest voting
blocks are, for example, 54.53% in Italy, 52.1% in Germany, 52.0% in Austria,
50.6% in Belgium and 43.5% in The Netherlands [Becht and Röell (1999)].
2.2. Model and variables
The following model is formulated to test for the differential informativeness
of earnings conditional on bank ownership:
[1]
AR a a NI a SIZE a MB a LEV a OWN a BANKOWN a NI SIZE
a NI MB a NI LEV a NI OWN a NI BANKOWN Y
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where ARi,t is the return of firm i for period t minus the expected return accord-
ing to the CAPM6, NIi,t is the net earnings in year t divided by the market value
of equity at the beginning of year t, SIZEi,t is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in thousands of
euros is higher than the median value and 0 otherwise, MBi,t is the market value
of equity divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of year t, LEVi,t
is the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of year t, OWN1i,t is
the percentage of equity of the major shareholder at the beginning of year t,
BANKOWNi,t is the percentage of bank ownership at the beginning of year t,
is a set of dummy time variables, ui is the individual effect and εit is the
error term in year t. Fixed effects of calendar years are included in the regressions
though, for the sake of simplicity, I omit reporting them here. The 1991 dummy is
omitted from the regressions. A set of variables is included to control for observed
variations in the earnings-return relation which are likely to be due to causes other
than ownership structure: market-to-book ratio, size and leverage. These variables
were included both as explanatory variables of returns and multiplicative varia-
bles of earnings. The market-to-book ratio (MB) is included to control for the ef-
fects of growth on the earnings-return relation. High-growth firms may be more
risky, which weakens the earnings-return relation [Fan and Wong (2002)]. Growth
opportunities, on the other hand, are likely to be positively associated with future
earnings levels and/or earnings persistence [Collins and Kothari (1989)]. In such
an environment, the net effect of growth on the earnings-return relation is an em-
pirical issue.
As managers have greater incentives to manage accruals in the presence of
covenant constraints attached to leverage, earnings quality and, hence, the earn-
ings response coefficient are expected to be lower for firms with higher leverage
[Watts and Zimmerman (1986); Sweeney (1994)]. Leverage could also be a proxy
for the riskiness of debt or default risk [Dhaliwal et al. (1991)]. Highly levered
firms are associated with high risk and, hence, their earnings-return relation is
weakened. In addition, I include firm size (SIZE) as a control for other missing
factors that may affect the earnings-return relation. In this respect, prior literature
[Atiase (1985); Freeman (1987)] has reported that public disclosure and private
development of non-earnings information are increasing functions of firm size.
However, Collins et al. (1987) shows that the information content of earnings is
inversely related to firm size, since it may also be associated with other economic
characteristics of the firm, e.g. political costs. The description of the variables is
reported in Appendix A.
Yt
t=
∑
1991
2003
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(6) Alternatively, the return of the firm and the return of the firm minus the stock market return
were used. Since the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the abnormal return of
the firm, they are not reported. Theo and Wong (1993) also obtained similar results regardless of
whether the abnormal return is defined as the return minus the market return or as the residual
from a market model regression.
The summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables of the re-
gression are reported in Table 2. The mean abnormal stock return is 15.24% and
the mean NI is 98%7. The table also shows the descriptive statistics depending on
the existence of bank ownership or not. The differences between the two subsam-
ples are only significant for the variable SIZE. Firms with bank ownership are
larger. The correlations between the independent variables are reported in Table 3.
These are generally small, except for the measures of ownership concentration,
suggesting that colinearity is not a serious problem. Table 3 also reports multicol-
inearity tests. The values of Tolerance and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
allow us to rule out the existence of problems of multicolinearity.
In line with the main goal of this paper, the parameters a10 and a11 measure thejoint relation between earnings informativeness and ownership concentration and
bank ownership, respectively, and reflect the extent to which the informativeness of
earnings is affected by a large shareholding level. The effect of NIit on ARit is positive-
ly (negatively) related to bank ownership if a11 is significantly greater (less) than zero. 
Two methods were used to test the non-linear relationship between ownership
concentration and the earnings-return relation. The first involves including the
square of the major shareholder ownership to test for the existence of a quadratic
relationship between ownership concentration and the informativeness of earnings.
The second method is a general extension of the piecewise model developed
by Morck et al. (1988), which shows the influence of ownership concentration on
the earnings-return relation by means of break points. Instead of allowing the co-
efficients on the ownership concentration variables to change at pre-determined
levels of ownership, the break points are determined endogenously. The stock re-
turn of the firm is regressed against ownership concentration and its square. We
control for firm size, debt ratio, and intangible fixed assets [Morck et al. (1988)
and McConnell and Servaes (1990)]:
Rit = β0 + β1OWN1it + β2SQ(OWN1it) + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5INTANGit + εit [2]
The quadratic relation proposed in model [2] presents a break point8, which
can be obtained by differentiating performance with respect to ownership concen-
tration. Letting this partial derivative equal zero, this breakpoint is -(β1/2β2). Since
the estimated values for β1 and β2 are respectively -0.8954 and 0.9248, the break
point is 48.41%. Hence, the variable OWN1 is replaced in its interaction with earn-
ings by the following variables: OWN1_L, which takes the value of the ownership
of the major shareholder if this is less than 48.41%, and 48.41% otherwise; and
OWN1_U, which takes the value 0 if the percentage of common shares held by the
major shareholder is less than 48.41%, and the percentage of common shares held
by the major shareholder minus 48.41% if the percentage is higher than 48.41%.
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(7) This value is affected by a few high observations; in fact, the median value is 6.00%. These
outliers do not affect the results, since the main results of the paper remain unaltered when they are
deleted, though the informativeness of earnings is increased.
(8) The cube of OWN1 is also included to examine the possibility of a cubic relationship between
ownership concentration and performance. However, it was not found to be significant.
Revista de Economía Aplicada
90
TA
BL
E
2:
SU
M
M
A
RY
ST
AT
IS
TI
CS
O
F
TH
E
D
EP
EN
D
EN
T
A
N
D
IN
D
EP
EN
D
EN
T
VA
RI
A
BL
ES
Va
ria
bl
es
M
ea
n
St
an
da
rd
Fi
rs
t Q
ua
rtil
e
M
ed
ian
Th
ird
 Q
ua
rti
le
D
ev
ia
tio
n
To
ta
l s
am
pl
e
15
.2
4
12
2.
52
-
28
.3
0
-
2.
15
25
.9
9
R
i,t
–
 
E(
R i
,t) 
(%
)
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
14
.5
9
11
3.
01
-
25
.1
8
0.
95
29
.2
3
Fi
rm
s w
ith
ou
t b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
15
.9
8
13
2.
68
-
30
.6
4
-
4.
63
23
.2
7
To
ta
l s
am
pl
e
0.
98
36
.8
6
0.
01
0.
06
0.
11
N
I i,
t(%
)
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
-
0.
03
0.
74
0.
01
0.
06
0.
10
Fi
rm
s w
ith
ou
t b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
2.
15
54
.0
3
0.
01
0.
06
0.
13
To
ta
l s
am
pl
e
18
.4
0
2.
07
17
.0
3
18
.3
0
19
.7
4
SI
ZE
i,t
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
18
.8
3
2.
01
17
.4
4
18
.6
8
20
.1
5
Fi
rm
s w
ith
ou
t b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
17
.9
0
2.
03
16
.5
4
17
.7
6
19
.3
0
To
ta
l s
am
pl
e
42
.5
0
23
.0
8
25
.5
0
42
.2
3
57
.2
8
LE
V
i,t
(%
)
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
42
.5
4
24
.5
2
23
.2
2
43
.3
9
57
.4
3
Fi
rm
s w
ith
ou
t b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
42
.4
5
21
.3
3
27
.8
5
41
.1
8
57
.1
0
To
ta
l s
am
pl
e
1.
97
4.
57
0.
66
1.
18
2.
01
M
B
i,t
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
1.
97
2.
86
0.
82
1.
30
2.
13
Fi
rm
s w
ith
ou
t b
an
k 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
1.
98
5.
96
0.
48
0.
99
1.
84
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
pr
es
en
ts 
th
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
sta
tis
tic
s 
of
 th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
t a
nd
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
 fo
r l
ist
ed
 fi
rm
s 
o
n
 t
he
 S
pa
ni
sh
 S
to
ck
 E
xc
ha
n
ge
 o
v
er
 t
he
 p
er
io
d
19
91
-2
00
3.
 T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
f f
irm
 i 
fo
r p
er
io
d 
t m
in
us
 th
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 re
tu
rn
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
CA
PM
; N
I i,
ti
s t
he
 n
et
 e
ar
ni
ng
s i
n 
ye
ar
 t
di
v
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 a
t t
he
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
f y
ea
r t
; S
IZ
E i
,t
is 
th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f t
he
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 in
 th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f e
ur
os
; L
EV
i,t
is 
th
e 
to
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
y 
di
v
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s a
t t
he
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
f y
ea
r t
; a
nd
 M
B i
,t
is 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
bo
ok
 v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 a
t t
he
 b
e-
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 y
ea
r t
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n 
el
ab
or
at
io
n.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results for the influence of large shareholdings on the informativeness of
earnings are shown in Table 4, and in Table 5, for the joint effect of ownership
concentration and bank ownership on earnings informativeness. The previous lit-
erature has used a pooled cross-sectional time series regression model to investi-
gate the information content of earnings conditional on several variables. In the
present paper, I employ both a panel data estimation and a pooled cross-sectional
time series regression model. The panel data estimation allows us to correct for
unobserved firm-specific and time-specific effects. Since there are no qualitative
differences in the results between a panel data estimation and a pooled cross-sec-
tional time series regression model, only the panel data estimation is reported.
The panel data estimation was calculated using random effects, since the Haus-
man test does not reject the null hypothesis of the lack of correlation between in-
dividual effects and observable variables9. The results do not vary when the esti-
mation takes into account the assumption that the explanatory variables may not
be exogenous. These results were obtained by applying the generalized-method-
of-moments (GMM) estimator developed for dynamic models of panel data by
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Table 3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
AND MULTICOLINEARITY TESTS
NI SIZE MB LEV OWN1 BANKOWN
NI 1.0000
SIZE -0.0206 1.0000
MB -0.0079 0.2535 1.0000
LEV -0.0413 -0.0628 0.0506 1.0000
OWN1 0.0177 0.0550 -0.0129 -0.0055 1.0000
BANKOWN -0.0170 0.1168 -0.0134 0.0014 0.0041 1.0000
Tolerance 0.996 0.877 0.888 0.969 0.979 0.986
VIF 1.004 1.141 1.126 1.032 1.021 1.015
The table presents the correlation and multicolinearity tests of the independent variables for listed
firms on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 1991-2003. NIi,t is the net earnings in year t
divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t; SIZEi,t is the natural logarithm of
the market value of equity in thousands of euros; MBi,t is the market value of equity divided by the
book value of equity at the beginning of year t; LEVi,t is the total liability divided by total assets at
the beginning of year t; OWN1 is the percentage of common shares held by the major shareholder;
and BANKOWN is the percentage of common shares held by banks.
Source: Own elaboration.
(9) Hausman’s test is equal to 24.17 –probability value 0.28– for the basic estimation (Table 4,
column 1).
Arellano and Bond (1991). As the results obtained using random effects and the
GMM estimator are generally similar, they will be discussed without distinguish-
ing between the two methods of estimation.
3.1. Large shareholders and informativeness of earnings
Table 4 shows the role of ownership concentration with respect to the infor-
mativeness of earnings. The coefficient of NI is significantly positive, which sug-
gests that earnings are informative. Size and the market-to-book ratio have a nega-
tive influence on returns. These results are consistent with the literature on
anomalies of size and growth-value stocks [Fama and French (1992)].
The coefficients of NI*MB and NI*LEV are significantly negative. As for
the influence of the market-to-book ratio on earnings-return sensitivity, this is
consistent with the argument that the risk associated with growth firms weakens
the informativeness of earnings. This effect seems to be greater than that of the
growth opportunities associated with high levels of future earnings. The estimated
coefficient of NI*LEV is significantly negative in a way that is consistent with the
existence of greater incentives to manage accruals in the presence of covenant
constraints attached to leverage10. A similar result has been reported by Jiambalvo
et al. (2002), among others.
The sign of the coefficient of NI*SIZE is not uniform in Table 4. The results
shown subsequently in Table 5 seem to suggest that larger firm earnings are more
informative, as indicated by the significantly positive coefficient of NI*SIZE. The
positive relation between size and the informativeness of earnings is consistent
with evidence reported by Chaney and Jeter (1992), Warfield et al. (1995), Fan and
Wong (2002) and Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007). However, when we
consider the sample without outliers, the coefficient of NI*SIZE is not significant. 
Results referring to the influence of ownership concentration on the infor-
mativeness of earnings indicate that earnings exhibit less explanatory power for
returns as ownership concentration increases. The coefficient of NI*OWN1
shows a negative influence on stock return. This effect persists regardless of the
measure of ownership concentration employed. Although only the coefficient for
the ownership of the major shareholder is shown, the results are similar when the
percentages of common shares held by the three or five major shareholders are
considered. This result is evidence in favour of the hypothesis that ownership
concentration weakens the informativeness of reported earnings to outside in-
vestors. Earnings credibility is weakened because minority shareholders antici-
pate that the ownership structure gives the controlling owners the ability and in-
centives to manipulate earnings for outright expropriation or to report
uninformative earnings so as to avoid their expropriation activities being detect-
ed. This result is similar to those reported by Fan and Wong (2002) for East Asia
and Santana-Martín et al. (2007) for Spain and is consistent with the expropria-
tion effect.
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(10) Similar results are obtained when bank leverage is considered instead of total leverage.
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Table 4: INFORMATIVENESS OF EARNINGS AND LARGE SHAREHOLDERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.24***
(0.42) (0.42) (0.47) (8.74) (8.86) (9.44)
[Ri-E(Ri)]t-1 -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(-9.07) (-5.82) (-4.98)
NI 0.52*** 1.02*** 1.20*** 0.77*** 2.20*** 2.02***
(6.23) (7.23) (9.34) (5.66) (5.45) (6.64)
SIZE -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.46*** -0.53*** -0.54***
(-3.50) (-3.35) (-3.22) (-5.00) (-6.47) (-6.31)
LEV -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.70*** -1.07***
(-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.61) (-0.32) (-2.80) (-4.29)
MB -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.30***
(-2.15) (-2.32) (-2.31) (-8.18) (-8.79) (-9.03)
OWN1 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.16 -0.13
(-0.46) (-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.85) (-1.13) (-0.88)
NI*SIZE 0.33*** -0.02 -0.18* 0.51*** -0.46*** -0.40***
(6.01) (-0.24) (-1.92) (5.51) (-3.32) (-3.14)
NI*LEV -0.24*** -0.30*** -0.42*** -0.29*** -0.58*** -0.76***
(-4.56) (-5.53) (-7.23) (-3.57) (-9.91) (-12.15)
NI*MB -0.29*** -0.15** -0.19*** -0.27*** 0.07 -0.18***
(-5.25) (-2.33) (-3.28) (-3.56) (0.79) (-4.23)
NI*OWN1 -0.65*** -2.95*** -1.12*** -7.55***
(-4.94) (-5.45) (-5.33) (-5.19)
NI*SQ (OWN1) 2.31*** 6.50***
(4.38) (5.24)
NI*OWN1_L -2.33*** -4.06***
(-8.44) (-6.12)
NI*OWN1_U 0.91*** 1.82***
(3.48) (4.97)
Calendar effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
no. observations 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,189 1,189 1,189
no. firms 235 235 235 191 191 191
Previous evidence on ownership structure and performance shows that the re-
lationship between the two variables may be non-linear [Morck et al. (1988)]. If
the incentive to collect information and monitor management and the interest in
obtaining private benefits of control of large shareholdings vary with the level of
ownership concentration, we should also expect the relationship between owner-
ship concentration and the informativeness of earnings to change its sign. Within
this context, I have tested whether the influence of ownership concentration on
the informativeness of earnings may result in a non-linear relationship.
Firstly, in order to test the non-linear relationship between ownership con-
centration and the earnings-return relation, the interaction between NI and the
square of OWN1 was included in the estimation. As can be seen in columns (2)
and (5), the results reveal that the linear coefficient takes a negative value, where-
as the squared coefficient takes positive values. Thus, for low levels of ownership
concentration, the informativeness of earnings decreases as the percentage of
common shares held by the major shareholder increases, whereas the effect is the
opposite for high levels of ownership concentration. Nonetheless, considering the
mean values of NI*OWN1 and NI*SQ(OWN1) and the coefficients obtained, it
can be seen that the effect of the quadratic term does not compensate for the nega-
tive sign of the linear term11. This allows us to state that the negative effect of
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Table 4: INFORMATIVENESS OF EARNINGS AND LARGE SHAREHOLDERS (continuation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R-Sq (%) 16.51 17.47 18.84
Wald test 328.13*** 350.90*** 384.85***
Sargan test 88.45** 93.39** 91.33**
m1 -3.98*** -4.05*** -4.08***
m2 -0.82 -0.24 -0.05
The table shows the results of a panel data estimation [columns (1) to (3)] and GMM estimator
[columns (4) to (6)]. The dependent variable is the return of firm i for period t minus the expected
return according to the CAPM model; NIi,t is the net earnings in year t divided by the market value
of equity at the beginning of year t; SIZEi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the na-
tural logarithm of the market value of equity in thousands of euros is higher than the median value
and 0 otherwise; LEVi,t is the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; MBi,t
is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of year t; OWN1
is the percentage of common shares held by the major shareholder; OWN_L and OWN_U are two-
step variables (see Appendix A). All the variables are measured per unit. Fixed effects of calendar
years are included. t-statistics are shown in brackets. “***”, “**” and “*” denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
(11) Additionally, the coefficient of NI*SQ(OWN1) is not significant when the outliers are delet-
ed, indicating that a non-linear relationship does not exist between ownership and the informative-
ness of earnings.
ownership concentration on the earnings-return relation predominates for any
level of ownership.
Secondly, I have tested whether the influence of ownership concentration on
the informativeness of earnings results in a non-linear relationship by means of
piecewise linear regressions. In its interaction with earnings, the variable OWN1
is replaced by two variables, OWN1_L and OWN1_U, as explained in Section 3.
The results are shown in columns (3) and (6) and fully coincide with those report-
ed above when considering the NI*OWN1 and NI*SQ(OWN1). The existence of
a negative effect of ownership concentration on the informativeness of earnings is
found for low levels of ownership and of a positive effect if the ownership of the
major shareholder is higher than 48.41%, although this positive effect does not
compensate for the negative coefficient of the OWN1_L. In general, these results
indicate that the expropriation effect is dominant at any level of ownership of the
major shareholder.
3.2. Bank ownership and informativeness of earnings
Table 5 shows the influence of bank ownership on the informativeness of
earnings. The percentage of bank ownership has a positive influence on the infor-
mativeness of earnings, as we can see in columns (1) and (5), while ownership
concentration continues to maintain a negative effect on the informativeness of
earnings. The positive relation between earnings and returns conditional on bank
ownership is likewise demonstrated if bank ownership is measured as a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank has a percentage of equity in the firm,
and zero otherwise (results not reported). These results are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that bank ownership implies fewer opportunities for accruals manage-
ment or earnings manipulation, by acting like active shareholders monitoring the
firms in which they have equity stakes.
The existence of a non-linear relationship between bank ownership and the
informativeness of earnings was tested including a new variable in model [1],
namely, the square of the percentage of bank ownership in interaction with earn-
ings. In view of the results shown in columns (2) and (6) in Table 5, it may be
stated that the influence of bank ownership on the informativeness of earnings is
positive for low percentages of bank ownership. However, when bank ownership
increases, a negative effect on the informativeness of earnings seems to exist, al-
though the significance of this effect varies according to the estimation method
employed.
On the other hand, if we separately consider the role of bank ownership de-
pending on whether the bank is the major shareholder or not, the results do not
show a different role on the part of the bank. Bank ownership, in its interaction with
earnings, is replaced by two additional variables. BANKOWNMS is the percentage
of common shares held by banks when a bank is the major shareholder of the firm,
and BANKOWNNOMS is the percentage of bank ownership when a bank is not the
major shareholder of the firm. The results show that NI*BANKOWNMS is positive
and significant, although it presents a lower coefficient than those obtained when
considering the variable BANKOWN. The coefficient of NI*BANKOWNNOMS
also takes a positive sign and presents a higher value, although the difference
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between the coefficients of NI*BANKOWNMS and NI*BANKOWNNOMS is not
significant. Consequently, bank ownership has a positive influence on the informa-
tiveness of earnings regardless of whether the bank is the major shareholder or not. 
The non-linear relationship depending on whether the bank is the major
shareholder or not is also investigated. The results seem to point to the non-signif-
icance of the quadratic terms, showing that non-linear effects do not exist as far as
the influence of bank ownership on the informativeness of earnings is concerned.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The present paper analyses the influence of large shareholders, and especial-
ly of bank ownership, on earnings informativeness with the aim of distinguishing
between a monitoring and an expropriation effect. The paper offers evidence on
the role of banks as large shareholders. When a bank has an equity stake in a firm,
the bank is an active shareholder monitoring the managers and reducing the op-
portunities for accruals management or earnings manipulation. The monitoring
effect of bank ownership exists whether firms are controlled by banks or not. 
In consonance with the literature, in which large shareholders represent their
own interest and enforce decisions that would give them private benefits of control,
the results also show a negative relation between ownership concentration and the
informativeness of earnings. This expropriation effect is dominant at any level of
ownership of the major shareholders, in line with controlling shareholders having
strong opportunistic incentives to expropriate minority shareholders. 
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ABSTRACT
El objetivo del trabajo es analizar el efecto de la presencia de grandes ac-
cionistas y de propiedad bancaria sobre la capacidad informativa de los
beneficios en España. Los resultados obtenidos ponen de manifiesto que
existe un efecto expropiación por parte del accionista principal para cual-
quier nivel de concentración de propiedad. Además, la propiedad banca-
ria está positivamente relacionada con la capacidad informativa de los
beneficios siendo consistente con el papel desempeñado por los bancos
como supervisores activos del comportamiento empresarial, no existien-
do diferencias atendiendo a que el banco sea o no el principal accionista
de la empresa.
Palabras clave: Capacidad informativa de los beneficios, grandes accio-
nistas, propiedad bancaria, efecto supervisión, efecto expropiación.
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